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IRREPARABILITY IRREPARABLY DAMAGED 
Doug Rendleman* 
THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE. By Douglas Lay-
cock. New York: Oxford University Press. 1991. Pp. xiii, 356. $37. 
Every lawyer who studies or participates in our curious enterprise 
of constitutional government through courts should scrutinize Doug-
las Laycock's outstanding book, The Death of the Irreparable Injury 
Rule. 1 For Laycock provides us with a means to understand and eval-
uate the way judges developed the most vital feature of our remedial 
system - personal orders, injunctions in particular - and to predict, 
with a fair degree of certainty, the course of their development. Lay-
cock tells the story by analyzing the decline and, he says, the fall of the 
prerequisite to qualify for equitable relief: the claimant's demonstra-
tion that, absent equitable relief, she risks irreparable injury. I found 
myself agreeing with Laycock's major theme, that demonstrating ir-
reparability has become otiose. Nevertheless, his method of assimilat-
ing personal orders into the remedial system by deemphasizing 
important differences between personal orders and compensation 
causes me discomfort. 
We begin with a successful claimant who has proved that a wrong-
doer has breached the substantive law. The claimant is entitled to 
something from the menu of remedies. The menu includes damages to 
compensate the claimant's past loss, restitution to prevent the defend-
ant's unjust enrichment, punitive damages to punish the defendant, 
and personal orders to protect the claimant by telling the defendant 
either to unwind accomplished harm or not to cause future harm. In 
our survey, the claimant's quest concentrates on personal orders and 
alternatives. Before the judge enters a personal order telling the de-
• Huntley Professor, Washington and Lee Law School. J.D. 1968, Iowa; LL.M. 1970, 
Michigan. - Ed. The reviewer thanks Gene Shreve for comments on an earlier draft. 
This review is dedicated to the memory of the late Ed Yorio, a consummate professional, who 
passed away at the age of 44 in January of 1992. I am sorry that Ed will not be around to 
participate in the dialogue. See infra note 35. 
Truth-In-Reviewing Disclosure Statement: I have known the author since the 1970s and 
value him as a colleague. I read his work with interest and profit as it appears. I have been 
involved with his anti-irreparable injury project in several ways. I read the earlier draft in 1987 
and wrote him a detailed letter. I commented on the Harvard Law Review article at the Reme-
dies Section program in 1990; I believe the book responds to some of my remarks. See, e.g. pp. 
14-15, 18-19. The book cites my work as defending the rule it delivers the eulogy for. Seep. 4 & 
p. 24 n.4; p. 6 & p. 25 n.7; p. 9 & p. 28 n.18; p. 213 & p. 224 n.I (citing Doug Rendleman, Tlze 
Inadequate Remedy at Law Prerequisite for an Injunction, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 346 {1981)). 
1. Douglas Laycock is Alice McKean Young Regents Chair, University of Texas Law 
School. 
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fendant to alter conduct, he should be assured that the altered conduct 
will benefit the claimant; if the defendant causes harm that is over and 
done with, the judge should compensate the claimant with money 
damages. 
The judge selects a remedial solution and measures it. This inquiry 
has three stages: (1) define substantive law goals and consult the 
claimant's preferences, seeking a solution that advances both; (2) de-
termine whether remedial policies dictate augmenting or attenuating 
the proposed solution; (3) measure, define, and coordinate parts of the 
solution to assure that it covers the claimant's injury without over- or 
underremedying and to assure that some parts do not duplicate or 
overlap others. 
Laycock's analysis focuses on the first two stages of the inquiry. 
His study recasts these more precisely as follows: (1) beginning with 
the claimant's preference for a personal remedy, .the judge asks which 
remedy - a personal order versus money, or sometimes a criminal 
sanction - best serves the substantive policies? and (2) if the judge 
selects a personal order, do any remedial policies militate against per-
sonal orders and lead him to disfavor that order? The irreparable in-
jury rule is, or was, a remedial policy that tells the judge to reject the 
claimant's choice of an equitable remedy unless she establishes that 
the remedy at law is inadequate or, in equivalent terms, that absent 
equitable relief irreparable injury will occur.2 
I. THE LA w-EQUITY DISTINCTION 
The irreparable injury rule governs courts' choice between legal 
and equitable remedies. Merger of law and equity is incomplete; in 
most of our state systems, some parts of the field are considered per-
manently "equitable jurisdiction"3 where equitable attributes prevail 
without any irreparability test. Traditionally equitable subjects in-
clude quiet title, partition, liens and mortgages, trusts, fiduciaries, 
guardianship, dissolution of marriage, and adoption. 
The irreparable injury prerequisite for equitable relief holds sway 
where legal and equitable jurisdiction is concurrent and a claimant 
may receive either a legal or an equitable remedy - for example in 
contracts, torts, and copyright. The principal equitable remedies dis-
cussed below are injunctions and specific performance.4 The injunc-
2. The Supreme Court stated it as follows earlier this year: "[A] court should determine the 
adequacy of a remedy in law before resorting to equitable relief. Under the ordinary convention, 
the proper inquiry would be whether monetary damages provided an adequate remedy, and if 
not, whether equitable relief would be appropriate." Franklin v. Gwinnett County, 112 S.Ct. 
1028, 1038 (1992). 
3. The text uses quotation marks once because "equity jurisdiction" is not jurisdictional in 
the usual sense of defining a court's power to act. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS 
OF EQUITY 301-06 (1950). 
4. Other equitable remedies are constructive trusts, resulting trusts, equitable liens, subroga-
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tion is modem equity's premier remedy; it began in obscurity, dividing 
business between two courts and protecting property, grew into bump-
tious adolescence as a tool for enterprise to wield against its employ-
ees, and achieved the present stage of its growth facilitating judges' 
efforts to assure constitutional rights. 5 
A. Tenuousness 
Although the irreparable injury rule is phrased as dividing the re-
medial world into legal and equitable spheres, the judge's functional 
remedial choice is between a money substitute on the one hand and a 
personal order, an injunction or specific performance, on the other. In 
concurrent jurisdiction, the historical law-equity line follows the func-
tional money-conduct distinction, but only up to a point. Usually 
legal relief is money and equitable relief is a personal order. 
Carrying on the great legal realist tradition of Walter Wheeler 
Cook, 6 Laycock shows that courts have not maintained the law-equity 
distinction at the remedial stage; the line is neither functional nor con-
gruent with the choice between money substitutes and personal orders. 
Some relief classified as legal lets the winner enjoy the interest-in-fact 
instead of a money substitute. For example, the nominally legal reme-
dies of ejectment and replevin are personal orders in practice because 
they return the specific thing to its owner. 7 While law takes in equity's 
wash, equity takes in law's; equitable orders frequently include money 
awards to compensate. Finally, some important remedies subsist in 
both camps. Restitution wears both legal and equitable garb. Rescis-
sion of contracts occurs under both legal and equitable rubric. And 
courts have referred to declaratory judgments as both legal and equita-
ble (pp. 14-15). 
B. Consequences 
Even though the distinction is difficult to achieve and perilous to 
maintain, the characterization as either equitable or legal carries im-
portant consequences. Equity leads to judicial factfinding, personal 
orders, and contempt enforcement; law leads to jury factfinding, 
tion, accounting, and reformation. The Death of the I"eparable Injury Rule does not address 
legal and equitable restitution systematically even though that irreparability prerequisite is least 
defensible. GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF REsTinmoN § 1.6 (1978). I will focus on the 
all-purpose equitable remedies, injunctions and specific performance. 
5. OWEN M. F1ss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978). 
6. See generally Walter W. Cook, The Powers of Courts of Equity (pts. 1 & 2), 15 COLUM. L. 
REv. 37, 106 (1915). 
7. Pp. 13-14. Ejectment and replevin are also fugitives in the modern law curriculum; a 
leading property casebook disclaims responsibility for them to "your course in civil procedure." 
JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 68 n.25 (2d ed. 1988). The modern proce-
dure teacher greets this tender with a blank stare of disbelief or hoots of derision. Many upper-
level courses in Remedies cover ejectment and replevin, however, and that may prevent future 
generations of lawyers from ignoring these curricular orphans completely. 
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money judgments, and impersonal collection. 8 Even if historical labels 
no longer serve a functional purpose, these "equitable" and "legal" 
bundles will normally stay together. Factfinding by judges will pre-
cede personal orders and contempt enforcement. Juries will be em-
paneled for money judgments, which will be collected impersonally. 
Judges will preside over trials when injunctions are likely because 
policymakers in courts and legislatures will seek to avoid the spectacle 
of juries handing judges injunctions to administer.9 
In addition, the constitutional jury trial right and the need for a 
standard external to the modem judiciary will "preserve" the jury in 
legal actions "at common law" - in the main, money damage ac-
tions. Io Equitable-legal distinctions raise procedural complexities be-
cause of the constitutional right to a civil jury trial. In the federal 
system and all but a few states, because of jury trial rights, a jury per-
forms the binding factfinding in legal actions, the judge in equitable. I I 
Judges administer the irreparable injury rule, with its preference for 
legal remedies, to sort legal from equitable in ways that protect a liti-
gant's right to have legal actions heard by a jury. Although claimants 
normally seek juries to augment damages, when either plaintiffs or de-
fendants characterize claims to secure or avoid a jury, Laycock main-
tains, judges are alert to interpret and administer the jury trial right in 
ways that protect that right without undermining the claimant's ulti-
mate choice of the most appropriate legal or equitable remedy (pp. 
213-17). Laycock might have treated thejury trial right more sympa-
thetically; although The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule discusses 
the civil jury, it stresses the jury's mechanics and nuisance value more 
than its important populistic role in a pluralistic society. I2 
8. P. 12. Laycock adds several refinements, among them that preliminary relief is available 
in equity but not law. He may mean that preliminary money damage is not available in damage 
actions at law; if not, he might have also mentioned legal preliminary relief, prejudgment attach-
ment, and replevin. Other differences that the legal-equitable characterization may affect include 
attachment, prejudgment interest, attorney fees, appealability, and scope of review of facts on 
appeal. KENNETH H. YORK ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON REMEDIES 245 (5th ed. 1992). 
This review will focus on the consequences mentioned in the text. 
9. In C & K Engg. Contractors v. Amber Steel Co., 587 P.2d 1136 (Cal. 1978), Justice New-
man in dissent referred to "a basic policy concern; that is, the typically more continuing and 
more personalized involvement of the trial judge in specific performance and injunctive decrees 
than in mere judgments for damages." 587 P.2d at 1143 (Newman, J., dissenting). For a con-
trary view, see Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflections, 
1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 33, 75. 
10. Carrington, supra note 9, at 33, 74 (quoting U.S. CoNST. amend. VII). 
11. In Texas and North Carolina, juries find the facts in equity. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Wack-
enhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 676 n.l (Tex. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 755 (1991); Allan S. 
Meade & Assocs., Inc. v. McGarry, 315 S.E.2d 69 (N.C. App. 1984) (anticipating a jury trial of 
the equitable remedy of reformation). 
12. Pp. 166, 213-17. Through our national history, the prevailing sorting mechanisms for 
legal and equitable remedies have expressed the preference for civil juries. Until Congress re-
vised the judicial code in 1948, § 16 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 told the federal courts to avoid 
"suits in equity .•• in any case where a plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law." 
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 73, 82 (repealed 1948). Section 16's first draft forbade 
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C. No Remedial Paradise 
Fulfillment of the remedial promise of the merger of law and eq-
uity has escaped us. Reformers argued at least as early as 1848 that 
the judge should grant the winning claimant relief consistent with the 
pleading and proof. 13 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure repeated 
in Rule 54(c) the mergermeisters' aspiration to give winning litigants 
their just deserts: "every final judgment shall grant the relief to which 
the [claimant] is entitled."14 The Advisory Committee's notes rein-
forced the idea that "a judgment should give the relief to which a 
party is entitled, regardless of whether it is legal or equitable or 
both."15 "Modem procedural reforms," our contracts restaters con-
sole us without clarifying, "have blurred the distinction between reme-
dies at law and equity."16 Two generations after procedural merger, 
the leading practice work observed: "Eventually it may well be that 
courts will feel free to ask only: 'What remedy is best adapted to mak-
ing the plaintiff whole?' "17 
We continue to project the golden age farther into the future be-
cause the civil jury trial right has embalmed the "ancient and irra-
tional intricacies" of eighteenth-century law and equity for future 
generations.18 Lack of an adequate remedy at law remains an element 
of the plaintiff's case for an injunction or specific performance. 19 
Perhaps the golden age is dawning. Laycock examines the dis-
equity "suits .•. where remedy may be had at law." The limiting words "plain, adequate, and 
complete" were added before "remedy" to circumscribe equity courts; the language was intended 
to prevent litigants from resorting to equity to avoid jury trials. A supporter of the amendment, 
Senator Maclay of Pennsylvania, said, ''The trial by jury is considered as the birthright of every 
American. It is a privilege they are fond of, and let me add, it is a privilege they will not part 
with." WILFRED J. Rrrz, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY Acr OF 1789, at 144, 
175-77 (Wythe Holt & L.H. LaRue eds., 1990). 
Modem litigants may pay a high price to claim their birthright. The constitutional test for 
the jury trial right is an inflexible mechanism. Functional considerations have been laid to one 
side, leading to historical doctrine that Professor Carrington referred to as a "dusty cobweb" and 
a "large, intricate web of judge-made constitutional anachronism." Carrington, supra note 9, at 
74. Farther down on the same page Carrington "embalmed" the webs. Id. at 74-75. 
Stressing the word preserved in the Seventh Amendment, Professor McCoid found that even 
the Supreme Court loses its anachronisms in the dust. It confuses its inquiry into premerger 
custom by converting analysis of remedy into a separate question. It exacerbates this confusion 
by equating preferences with fraudulent conveyances. John C. McCoid II, Right to Jury Trial in 
Bankruptcy: Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 15, 19-28 (1991). 
13. See THE FIRST REPORT OF THE (NEW YORK) COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND 
PLEADING§ 231, at 194-95 (1848), quoted in Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Com-
mon Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 
909, 934 (1987). 
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(c). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 2. 
15. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(c) advisory committee's note. 
16. REs'fATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 208 cmt. b (1979). 
17. 4 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 1043 (1987). 
18. Carrington, supra note 9, at 74-75. 
19. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 17, § 1256. 
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putes in concurrent legal and equitable jurisdiction where the claimant 
seeks an injunction or specific performance and there is a genuine 
choice between compensation and a personal order. The words irrepa-
rable injury tell us that a formidable barrier confronts a plaintiff who 
seeks an injunction. The reality differs. Under the cover of reciting 
the irreparable injury rule, courts have changed it. "A legal remedy," 
Laycock says, "is adequate only if it is as complete, practical, and effi-
cient as the equitable remedy" (p. 22). Laycock's research demon-
strates that, in the main, claimants who need one may choose an 
injunction or specific performance over money damages. Courts treat 
the compensatory substitute as inadequate. 
As well they should. For few of us answer yes to Pomeroy's ques-
tion: Should a judge stand idly by, watch a wrongdoer inflict harm, 
and only later tell him to pay the victim?20 The sum of the words 
irreparable and injury is less than the meaning of each separately. 
Under Laycock's suggested approach, the claimant may select 
damages or equitable relief, an injunction or specific performance. 
The claimant's choice of remedy governs unless "countervailing inter-
ests outweigh the plaintiff's interest in the remedy he prefers" (p. 266). 
This statement of the test appears to deemphasize the judge's role in 
evaluating the substantive law and remedial policies. Apparently the 
relevant reasons for a judge to deny injunctions and specific perform-
ance are to be raised as affirmative defenses and the defendant will 
bear the burden of refuting the plaintiff's request for specific relief. 
In the finest tradition of legal realism, Laycock analyzes the re-
ceived doctrine in light of what courts actually decide to determine 
whether the stated rules are the operating rules.21 He begins by 
stressing the necessity of articulating the real reasons for remedial 
choices; he discovers that, while the irreparable injury rule created the 
appearance of a principle of confinement on equity, in reality it failed 
to serve that purpose (pp. 237-43). Statements of the irreparable in-
jury rule are more than mere linguistic antisynergy. The rule, Lay-
cock shows, covers up the way disputes are decided, allows the judge 
to escape the constraint of stating reasons, lulls us into a false sense of 
certainty where none exists, prevents us from formulating better rules, 
and may deceive some poor literally minded chumps into doing the 
wrong thing (pp. 237-43). 
We assimilate, process, and assess new knowledge and information 
in ways that constrain us to change preexisting beliefs as little as possi-
ble. The iron grip of obsolete ideas is a major theme of Laycock's 
20. Paraphrased from 3 JOHN M. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS 
ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 1357, at 389 (1883), which Laycock 
quotes on p. 3. -
21. See Cook, supra note 6, at 106 ("examin[ing] a series of concrete cases and see[ing] ex-
actly what it is that the chancellor does and does not do"). 
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work. 22 The mental habits developed by filtering the legal profession's 
thinking through the dual system of law and equity interfered with the 
creation of a functional system of remedies. But The Death of the Ir-
reparable Injury Rule may contribute to the development of a more 
precise terminology. As the profession learns that the legal-equitable 
distinction is not functional and no longer useful except for analyzing 
the constitutional right to a civil jury, it may replace the more general 
terms equitable jurisdiction and equitable remedy with the name of the 
particular remedy - injunction or specific performance. Except for 
the jury trial right, postmerger policymakers in legislatures and courts 
might omit the megaclassifications, legal and equitable, and decide 
questions like scope of review based on policies discrete to each sub-
ject. Characterization as legal or equitable, if necessary for one pur-
pose, need not carry over to others. 23 The choice should be a practical 
one for functional rather than historical reasons. 
II. THE IIR's STATE OF INSTABILITY 
Perhaps the irreparable injury rule has been operating in a reduced 
sphere for some time, formally unrepudiated but awaiting reformula-
tion. The rule has statutory antecedents and previously had jurisdic-
tional attributes, but it may have been subject to the same form of 
erosion as an obsolete common law substantive rule. Common law 
courts rarely abandon doctrines outright; instead they chip away with 
qualifications and exceptions until a new rule emerges - if they leave 
anything of the former rule, it is as an exception. 24 In 197 6, Professor 
Chayes, discussing the injunction's role in constitutional and particu-
larly structural litigation, observed: "It is perhaps too soon to reverse 
the traditional maxim to read that money damages will be awarded 
only when no suitable form of specific relief can be devised. But 
surely, the old sense of equitable remedies as 'extraordinary' has 
faded."25 
22. See, e.g., pp. 277, 281. 
23. See generally Moffatt Hancock, Fallacy of the Transplanted Category, 37 CAN. B. REV. 
535 (1959). 
24. See Moore v. McAllister, 141 A.2d 176, 179 (1958) (detailing the gradual demise of the 
rule against the use of equitable remedies in real property disputes unless legal title had been 
proved); Edward H. Rabin, The Law Favors the Vesting of Estates. Why?, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 
467, 473 (1965). 
25. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 
1292 (1976). Even then, however, the irreparable injury rule existed in a tenuous state of blissful 
insouciance, a state that Professor Eisenberg later named "instability." See generally MELVIN A. 
EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE CoMMON LAW (1988). The merger of law and equity had 
obviated the need for a law-equity test between court systems. When legal rules are inconsistent 
with other policies, scholars will develop that incongruity in the professional literature. Id. at 64. 
Nearly a century before, Pomeroy pointed out that the irreparable injury rule was inconsistent 
with an activist judiciary's remedial goal of preventing harm. P. 3 (quoting 3 POMEROY, supra 
note 20, § 1357, at 389). Soon after Chayes wrote, Professor Fiss called on policymakers to 
abolish the remedial hierarchy that subordinated the injunction to other remedies. F1ss, supra 
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Change in legal doctrine occurs when judges exempt certain types 
of activity from the established but unstable rule.26 Citizens ought to 
enjoy constitutional rights in fact, not money substitutes; courts per-
force ceased analyzing constitutional rights under the irreparable in-
jury rule.27 Courts can effectuate constitutional rights only by 
granting an injunction that seeks to assure that the citizen enjoys the 
rights in fact. The federal injunction was the premier remedy courts 
used during the civil rights era to specify and secure civil and constitu-
tional rights.28 The injunction's majestic role in the post-Brown era is, 
to put it euphemistically, "injeopardy."29 I believe that constitutional 
adjudication through injunctions will return. Although I hope to be 
around when dawn breaks, I cannot perceive the prospect to be an 
immediate one. Accordingly this review emphasizes the injunction's 
perils more than its potential. Whether an exception to the irreparable 
injury rule exists generally under statutes that define substantive rights 
is less clear, but courts administering some statutory schemes neutral-
ize the rule by presuming the plaintiff's irreparable harm from the 
defendant's violation. 30 
Legal rules inconsistent with society's understanding unravel be-
cause lawyers and judges cannot justify the results that those rules 
seem to compel. The irreparable injury rule's words had not changed, 
but courts had formulated and established new principles, in Eisen-
berg's words, "not only because they explain anomalous precedents in 
a way that prior principles cannot, but also because they reflect appli-
cable social propositions in a way that prior principles do not."31 The 
irreparable injury rule failed to reflect applicable norms, policies, and 
experience appropriately. Because of the new principles, the rule no 
longer meant what its words conveyed; it survived nominally and with 
reduced force.32 Just as someone who "could care less" really could 
not care less, the words irreparable, injury, and inadequate became 
transmogrified into idiom and lost their ordinary meaning in the pro-
fessional vernacular. 
note 5, at 6. My inquiry into the state of what I called the inadequacy prerequisite found the 
decisions departing from the professed rule without adequate statements of reasons. Rendleman, 
supra note•. 
26. EISENBERG, supra note 25, at 68. 
27. See, e.g., Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). Other examples include Nester's Map 
& Guide Corp. v. Hagstrom Map Co., 760 F. Supp. 36 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); PHE, Inc. v. Dept. of 
Justice, 743 F. Supp. 15, 26 (D.D.C. 1990); Robbins v. Budke, 739 F. Supp. 1479, 1485 (D.N.M. 
1990). 
28. See F1ss, supra note 5, at 86-90. 
29. Owen Fiss, A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshal/, 105 HARV. L. REv. 49, 50 (1991). 
30. See, e.g., Nester's Map & Guide Corp. v. Hagstrom Map Co., 760 F. Supp. 36 (E.D.N.Y. 
1991). 
31. EISENBERG, supra note 25, at 79·80. 
32. Id. at 118. 
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A. Special Handling? Specific Performance and Injunctions 
Even though the monolithic irreparable injury rule no longer ex-
ists, courts have several reasons to single out injunctions for special 
handling. Interlocutory relief through temporary restraining orders 
and preliminary injunctions follows attenuated, even ex parte, proce-
dure creating a greater than usual chance of error. Citizen participa-
tion in finding facts and applying the law is absent from the injunction 
process because judges hear requests for injunctions. If the alternative 
to an injunction is a criminal prosecution, the civil burden of proof by 
a preponderance of the evidence is easier for the plaintiff than the 
criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Tailoring relief 
to the plaintiff's discrete needs creates real administrative and poten-
tial enforcement burdens. If violations are charged, the judge who 
granted the injunction will usually preside over the contempt issue. 
An injunction defendant charged with criminal contempt cannot ar-
gue as a defense that the injunction is substantially erroneous or even 
that it is unconstitutional. For fair or for foul, the injunction process 
concentrates power in the judge to find the facts, apply the law, formu-
late relief, and enforce the order. 
The reader may find a discussion of specific performance, the other 
major "equitable remedy," helpful here. A buyer's right to have the 
property she bargained for is not a substantive right like a constitu-
tional right that courts think she must enjoy in fact. Nevertheless, 
specific performance has become a routine remedy for breach of a sales 
contract. The remedial policies that signal special handling for injunc-
tions are attenuated for specific performance. Two backup doctrines 
obviate the injunction's hazards in granting and enforcing specific per-
formance. Equitable cleanup is a greatly reduced threat to the defend-
ants' jury trial right. 33 Federal Rule 70 and state equivalent 
appointive and vesting rules or statutes supplant harsh contempt rem-
edies. 34 I join Laycock in arguing that courts ought to respect the 
claimant's preference for specific performance. 35 
On this salutary and uncontroversial point, Laycock's research 
turns up an anomaly. He examines reported decisions administering 
the irreparable injury rule and discovers that courts usually let the 
33. See Ziebarth v. Kalenze, 238 N.W.2d 261 (N.D. 1976) (postmerger application of 
cleanup doctrine). 
34. See FED. R. Civ. P. 70. 
35. Professor Ed Yorio has argued, on the other hand, that the party seeking specific per· 
formance ought to carry the burden. EDWARD YORIO, CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT: SPECIFIC 
PERFORMANCE AND INJUNCTIONS§ 2.5, at 41 (1989). His principal reasons to disfavor specific 
performance emerged from difficulties of enforcement, and he emphasized the possibility of harsh 
contempt sanctions. Id. § 3.2. Unlike Yorio, I prefer to subordinate specific performance's risks 
to breaching parties to its benefits to claimants. I adjure to courts an approach that favors claim· 
ant's desire for specific performance unless defendant develops considerations discrete to the 
dispute that militate against a personal order. 
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plaintiffs choose personal orders in the teeth of the rule's language. 
However, "the principal remnant of the irreparable injury rule" is an 
inexplicable welter of decisions declining specific performance of 
breached contracts to sell goods that appear to be fungible or difficult 
to replace (pp. 100-01). Why do nonbreaching buyers seek specific 
performance when they could spend a damage award to replace the 
item instead? Why do judges decline to issue a routine specific per-
formance order that is easy to adjudicate and administer? Empirical 
research might shed some light on this conundrum of remedies. I 
speculate that, to the buyer who has pursued specific performance to 
an appeal or to a reported trial court opinion, the dispute has achieved 
a momentum of its own or the goods are subjectively not fungible. 
The injunction, as summarized above, is not a routine remedy. In 
my judgment, the injunction requires special handling through princi-
ples of containment because of its potential both to benefit claimants 
and to overreach defendants. A question I asked myself about the 
thesis of The Death of the I"eparable Injury Rule is whether the prin-
ciples of containment must include the irreparable injury rule. Even if 
we abandon the remedial hierarchy and the irreparable injury prereq-
uisite to injunctions, the idea that courts enjoin when money is inap-
propriate will survive. The idea that money will be an unsatisfactory 
remedy for some injuries lies at the base of two complex bodies of 
doctrine: interlocutory injunctions and contempt. 
B. Interlocutory Relief 
Interlocutory injunctive relief, with temporary restraining orders 
and preliminary injunctions, is founded on an intractable dilemma 
that grows out of the determination that money will be an inadequate 
remedy. The plaintiff requires a court order to control the defendant's 
conduct right now because if the defendant violates or persists in vio-
lating the plaintiff's substantive interest, retrospective money damages 
will be unsatisfactory. But the procedural process has not functioned 
fully; entering an interlocutory order to protect the plaintiff's right· 
from "irreparable injury" entails an unusually high risk of judicial er-
ror. And an erroneous interlocutory injunction may inflict legally im-
proper harm on the defendant. 
Courts have developed procedures and standards for interlocutory 
injunctions. These attempt to accommodate the plaintiff's importu-
nate request for procedural haste to prevent irreparable injury to her-
self with procedural protections that reduce the risk of error and 
prevent harm to the defendant. Laycock says that the irreparable in-
jury analysis retains vitality at the interlocutory stage; he suggests that 
judges use the irreparable injury rule only to decide whether to issue 
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interlocutory personal orders. 36 
C. The Contempt Doctrines 
The contempt doctrines, particularly the coercive ones, are also 
inextricably related to the idea that money is sometimes an inappropri-
ate solution. Once the judge grants an injunction, the system is com-
mitted to securing the defendant's obedience. Coercive contempt is an 
elaborate mechanism to assure that the defendant's behavior will be 
modified to let the claimant enjoy her rights in fact rather than a 
money substitute. 37 Coercive campaigns are fraught with potential for 
overreaching. A single trial judge, who may be caught up emotionally 
in the struggle, exercises the power to imprison (perhaps indefinitely) 
without any of the checks that usually precede imprisonment.38 Lay-
cock's brief treatment of contempt's dangers (pp. 14-15, 18) does not 
highlight coercive contempt's risks to individual liberty; one of the de-
cisions he cites, that of the contemnor who "claimed to have lost 
$18,000 in cash while bird hunting,"39 is an archetype of coercion 
careening out of control, in which a judge is led to confine, potentially 
forever, someone who probably told an improbable truth but was 
disbelieved.40 
The collateral bar rule in criminal contempt is a conspicuous 
merit-avoidance technique and another reason for caution before en-
joining. When enjoined and charged with criminal contempt for viola-
tion, a defendant is barred from arguing as a defense that the 
injunction is incorrect under substantive law, or even that it is uncon-
stitutional. Based on the policy of punishing disrespect for the court, 
the collateral bar rule means that a contemnor may be punished for 
criminal contempt for conduct that is legal under substantive law, per-
haps even constitutionally protected.41 In contrast, a defendant who 
had breached a criminal statute will be exonerated if the statute is 
unconstitutional. But the collateral bar rule does not cross the pages 
of The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule. 
36. P. 241. OWEN M. FISs & DOUG RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS (2d ed. 1984) first called 
for separate terminology for interlocutory and permanent injunctions and reserved the word 
i"eparab/e for interlocutory relief. Id. at 59. 
37. Id. at 1004-06. 
38. Doug Rendleman, Disobedience and Coercive Contempt Confinement: The Terminally 
Stubborn Contemnor. 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 185, 190 (1991). 
39. P. 33 n.58 (citing Drake v. National Bank of Commerce, 190 S.E. 302, 304 (Va. 1937)). 
40. F1ss & RENDLEMAN, supra note 36, at 1092. For an example of the police mentality 
misplaced in coercive contempt, consider a Michigan law student's reaction to a recalcitrant 
depression-era contemnor who had been imprisoned for civil contempt following civil procedure: 
"[l]t is evident that the purposes of justice will be served best by keeping such persons as defend-
ant under lock and key. She may well spend her life in confinement, unless her attitude 
changes." Recent Decision, Equity-Contempt-Duration of Imprisonment, 36 MICH. L. REV. 
1016, 1018 (1938). 
41. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). 
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D. Equity and Romance 
The mystique of equity and injunctions persists. The idea endures 
that equity is separate, distinctive, and superior. One of the ways the 
legal profession uses the word equity is to describe flexible and discre-
tionary decisionmaking, crafting discrete solutions for particular 
problems when inflexible rules would create harsh results.42 The 
warm and fuzzy connotations of individualized justice will continue to 
influence the way we evaluate and discuss other parts of equity's 
jurisdiction. 
Professor Fiss has reminded us of another reason to single injunc-
tions out. Injunctions are crucial because they are "the primary rem-
edy in civil rights litigation."43 Money is a uniquely unsuitable solvent 
to dissolve Jim Crow. Judges may use injunctions to effect massive 
changes in government bureaucracies, to halt constitutional depriva-
tions, and to ameliorate the status of social groups.44 While the neces-
sities of the 1990s may lead liberals to draw down our reserves of 
patience as we await broad constitutional reform initiatives from the 
federal judiciary, the evidence of the injunction's role as a tool of an 
active judiciary is apparent, especially in education.45 However, The 
Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule's development of injunctions to 
advance constitutional goals is cursory.46 
I can conceive of two reasons to feel nostalgia for the irreparable 
injury prerequisite for an injunction: a civil libertarian's trepidation 
about procedural overreaching and a liberal's affection for the injunc-
tion's potential for constitutional reform. Laycock has convinced me 
that neither is a realistic reason to retain the irreparable injury rule. 
The irreparable injury rule failed to prevent concentration of state 
power where power threatens individual rights; statutes, the Constitu-
tion, and judicial restraint have served the cause of individual liberty 
not perfectly, but better. The argument for retaining the irreparable 
injury rule as a safeguard for equitable flexibility, discretion, and dis-
pensation contends for a principle that reduces its champion. One un-
intended consequence of an idealistic quest for individualized 
"equitable" justice may be to preserve the irreparable injury rule, a 
nonfunctional barrier to granting the remedy best tailored to winning 
litigants' needs. A better (but also ultimately unpersuasive) argument 
may be advanced for using the irreparable injury rule to ration scarce 
judicial resources, to preserve the injunctive process for important dis-
putes such as constitutional issues. 
42. Roscoe Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM. L. REv. 20, 20-22 (1905). 
43. FISS, supra note 5, at 86. 
44. Id. at 86-95. 
45. Id. 
46. See p. 41. Laycock provides half a paragraph of text. 
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E. Stricter Confinement Principles 
After limning the irreparable injury rule's present state and pro-
posing an alternative approach, Laycock turns his attention to several 
more precise principles that have grown in the shadow of the desiccat-
ing larger rule. Laycock hopes that these tests will develop from their 
roots in the policies that inform the choice between specific relief and 
alternatives. He develops the "countervailing interests" judges will 
consider to determine when to decline personal relief. Your reviewer's 
search for principles of containment continues. 
1. Balancing Tests 
Balancing plays a major role in the rules that will operate in Lay-
cock's post-irreparable injury rule world.47 If awarding the claimant a 
personal order will create undue hardship, burden innocent nonpar-
ties, or create practical burdens to implement, then the judge should 
ask whether these putative handicaps "outweigh the disadvantage to 
the pl~tiff of receiving only substitutionary relief" (pp. 268-69). Ad-
ditionally, balancing is central to Laycock's proposed replacement for 
the irreparable injury rule, which lets the claimant choose between a 
personal order and a money substitute unless the defendant shows that 
a countervailing interest outweighs the claimant's interest in the per-
sonal order he prefers (p. 266). 
How much will judges, lawyers, and litigants gain if the obsolete 
irreparable injury test is scuttled in favor of ubiquitous balancing? 
Judges may analyze disputes by identifying the interests that a deci-
sion one way or another will advance or retard by identifying the in-
terests, assigning values to the interests, comparing the quantum of 
value on each side, and deciding which side prevails. Criticism of bal-
ancing tests focuses on their potential, while purporting to consider 
both sides, to cloak subjective choices, and to submerge debate in 
pseudo-mathematical jargon.48 Decisionmakers cannot assign objec-
tive "weights" to the values or interests a decision affects; they can, 
however, decide which outcome they prefer, select the variables to 
consider, and mold them to reach the previously selected preferred 
result. 
The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule uses balancing tests in 
two general ways: first, to choose whether to enjoin or do nothing, as 
whether to issue a preliminary injunction or not; and second, to decide 
between an injunction and a different remedy, damages or a criminal 
prosecution. Using the term balancing interchangeably to describe 
these two different decisions erodes whatever meaning it had. In both, 
47. If The Death of the J"eparable Injury Rule were in database, I would use the SEARCH 
key and count all th~ times the words balance, balancing, weigh, and outweigh are used. 
48. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 
(1987). 
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moreover, the claimant's substantive right and stated preference sup-
port an injunction, but a balancing test may deflate that substantive 
right by converting it to just another factor to be weighed on one side 
of the scales. Balancing may be an errant way to decide at the policy 
stage whether to subordinate substantive interests and the claimant's 
choice of a personal order to a remedial policy that militates against an 
injunction. One alternative not mentioned in The Death of the Irrepa-
rable Injury Rule is that a thumb on the substantive side will nobble 
the remedial policy's ability to tip the scales. 
Observers have long criticized equitable decisionmaking as too 
subjective, varying from chancellor to chancellor like the length of 
their various feet.49 Perhaps, instead of assuming that judges can bal-
ance, we might develop ways of stating the process of decision to focus 
judges' critical judgment on choice - on who wins and why. Rights, 
principles, and structures defined externally may provide more gui-
dance for future decisionmakers. Evaluating remedial policy in .light 
of substantive rights and the claimant's choices will lead to difficult 
decisions with winners and losers. "To be sure," Justice Harlan said, 
"as with any rule of law which attempts to reconcile fundamentally 
antagonistic social policies, there may be occasional instances of actual 
injustice which will go unredressed, but we think that price a neces-
sary one to pay for the greater good."50 Balancing tests are less than 
redoubtable principles for those who seek to circumscribe the hazards 
of the injunction process. As Professor Aleinikoff reminded us, quot-
ing Cardozo, metaphors like balancing start "as devices to liberate 
thought, [but] they end often by enslaving it."51 · 
2. Other Principles of Confinement 
Several of Laycock's more precise tests are not stated as balancing 
rules. The judge choosing between money awards and personal orders 
ought to decline personal orders that will either: (1) force individual 
employees to perform personal services or unnecessarily compel em-
ployers to accept servic(fS; (2) impose an unconstitutional prior re-
straint; (3) treat one creditor of an insolvent debtor better than other 
similarly circumstanced creditors; (4) fail to defer to more appropriate 
decisionmakers, undermining another· tribunal's or branch's orderly 
business; (5) "inappropriately evade or override the more particular. 
provisions of other applicable la"7" (p. 271); or (6) coerce someone 
through contempt to pay money unless the debt is for family support 
or a statute authorizes coercion (pp. 269-74). I consider bringing these 
principles of confinement together and organizing them around the 
49. FISS & RENDLEMAN, supra note 36, at 104-08. 
50. ·Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 576 (1959) (Harlan, J.). 
51. Aleinikoff, supra note 48, at 1005 (quoting Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 155 N.E. 58, 61 
(N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo; J.)). 
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core of more precise alternatives to the irreparable injury rule to be 
one of the book's primary contributions. 
F. The !JR and Debris 
Judges, Laycock learned, have been talking about the irreparable 
injury rule incessantly and using it to make all kinds of decisions. 
Laycock mentions other reasons, good and bad, that judges have fur-
nished when citing the irreparable injury rule to decline relief. Like a 
Michigan March thaw, Laycock's careful work exposes the debris; it 
shows us - to continue the metaphor - how much trash needs to be · 
hauled off in May. If courts use the irreparable injury rule at all in 
passing on final relief, they should first reserve it for disputes where 
the plaintiff is entitled to some relief; within that sphere of cases, the 
rule can help identify disputes where the plaintiff is entitled to dam-
ages, but, because irreparable injury is lacking, not an injunction. If, 
however, the court finds the claimant is entitled to no final relief at all, 
the irreparable injury rule is misplaced as an explanation. 
For example, some claimants request injunctions that would be 
premature because the defendant has neither injured the claimant nor 
threatened unlawful conduct harmful to the claimant in the future. 
Others would seek injunctions that arrive too late to do anything 
about an injury the defendant has already caused. These requests fre-
quently inspire courts to say that the claimant lacks an irreparable 
injury. This is true but both superfluous and deceptive. If the claim-
ant's claim is unripe or moot, she is not entitled to any remedy at all. 
Introducing the irreparable injury rule adds nothing but confusion to 
an already difficult inquiry {pp. 220-26). Ripeness and mootness are 
not ways to choose between a legal and an equitable remedy - they 
are reasons to decline all relief. 
When the way a rule is expressed differs from the way it is admin-
istered, hapless attorneys and judges may read the rule literally and 
naively think it means what it says. This probably occurs in law of-
fices and in negotiations; it undoubtedly does happen in trial and ap-
pellate courts {pp. 100-04). 
Courts disguise hostility to the merits behind distorted conclusions 
that the plaintiff lacked irreparable injury {pp. 196-99). "Hostility to 
the merits" does not appear to be a rule against equitable relief (p. 
238). This phrase ought not to mean that a judge declined relief and 
used lack of irreparable injury as a cloak, improperly donned, to de-
cide against a plaintiff who is asserting sound theories to which the 
judge is hostile. 
Laycock wraps it up with an anti-Restatement comprising three 
rules he does not commend, set in brackets to warn the unwary reader. 
Judges, he argues first, should be allowed to enter prejudgment money 
relief. He next proposes to abolish the doctrine that deprives a buyer 
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of specific performance of a contract to buy fungible goods from a 
solvent seller. Apparently the basic premise of a plaintiff's choice lets 
the buyer choose either specific performance and the goods or a money 
judgment with which to buy the identical goods from another (pp. 
274-75). Finally, Laycock reprobates the rules that disfavor injunc-
tions to substitute for or to supplement criminal prosecutions on the 
ground that they are largely superannuated. 52 
III. BALANCING HARDSHIPS 
Two of the subjects discussed in the overenforcement chapter -
balancing the hardships or equities in land use allocations and per-
sonal relief in the employment relation - show how the irreparable 
injury rule and the more precise tests operate today. Developing these 
two doctrines, further than the chapter does, to include fear of "extor-
tionate" settlements will reveal the way a related principle of confine-
ment militates against an injunction in both. Another doctrine that 
attenuates personal orders, dislike of protracted supervision, segues 
into employment orders. 
A. Land Use Balancing 
A claimant may seek an injunction to unbalance settlement negoti-
ations with a wrongdoer and to achieve a larger amount of money. If 
the judge concludes that the dispute is economic, he may prefer a neu-
trally set money award to a personal order that the claimant may ex-
change for disproportionate cash consideration. For example, suppose 
that the defendant has built an elaborate stone fence along the prop-
erty line between him and his neighbor. Because of a surveyor's error, 
the defendant's fence encroaches on several square feet of the neigh-
bor's property; while the neighbor's land is worth about $5, rebuilding 
the defendant's fence will cost around $1000. 
In the inevitable lawsuit, the neighbor seeks a mandatory injunc-
tion to force the defendant fence owner to remove the fence. The 
fence owner unsuccessfully interposes the traditional first-line defenses 
to an injunction: that equity declines to try title and that the remedies 
at law, damage or ejectment, are adequate. There are no fact ques-
tions about title. Realty is unique, and the interest cannot be compen-
sated; ejectment also is unsatisfactory because the sheriff cannot or 
will not remove the fence. The judge will enjoin temporary trespass, 
52. A potential criminal defendant's right to criminal procedure - including a criminal jury 
- comes under a bar verbally more precise than the irreparable injury rule: equity will not enjoin 
a crime. With but one significant exception, Laycock argues, courts that enjoin crimes articulate 
the importance of preventing violations and protecting the public interest. Reticence to enjoin 
criminal activity, he asserts, is a variation on requiring irreparable injury and just as dead. Pp. 
217-20. Your reviewer joins the mourners. 
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repeated or continuing, to obviate the landowner's need to maintain 
multiple damage actions. 
Balancing the hardships is the defendant's second-line objection to 
an injunction. An order to remove the fence will "cost" the defendant 
$1000 but "benefit" the neighbor only $5. In addition, destruction 
may be a "wasteful" way to employ resources. The judge will balance 
the hardships when an injunction compelling a good faith tortfeasor to 
remove an encroachment has a disparate effect; comparing the plain-
tiff's loss absent an injunction with the defendant's cost to obey an 
injunction, the judge will ask whether it will cost the defendant a lot 
more to obey an injunction than the plaintiff's benefit from the injunc-
tion. If the defendant's balancing-the-hardships defense succeeds, the 
judge will allow the encroaching fence to remain in place, but the de-
fendant will compensate the landowner and receive either an easement 
over or ownership of the encroached-upon property. The Death of the 
Irreparable Injury Rule develops balancing the hardships up to this 
point. 
In addition to the wastefulness of reconstructing the fence, another 
reason cautions against an injunction. If the judge grants an injunc-
tion, the neighbor may threaten to enforce it to coerce the defendant to 
settle on her terms; her starting figure will be $999. In Zerr v. Heceta 
Lodge Number 111, 53 for example, the plaintiff, claiming pie-in-the-
sky damages, may have been seeking an opportunistic settlement. The 
judge balanced the hardships and declined to enter an injunction that 
would have unbalanced settlement negotiations.54 
But balancing the hardships to deny an injunction that may un-
fairly skew settlement negotiations is based in part on the premise that 
the dispute is primarily economic. The policies that led to the irrepa-
rable injury rule have emerged in another guise. The staple classroom 
questions emerge: Does balancing the equities balance the owner's 
property right away? Does it undermine the owner's right to possess 
land and to protect the land's physical integrity? Based on the premise 
that real e8tate is an economic tool, does balancing the equities erode 
the concept that each parcel of real estate is unique?55 
B. The Example of Employment Discrimination 
1. Reinstatement Balancing 
Employees' remedies for violations of civil rights statutes present 
similar remedial policy conflicts. Two important recent sex discrimi-
nation decisions have ordered plaintiffs' reinstatements, one with ten-
53. 523 P.2d 1018 (Or. 1974). 
54. 523 P.2d at 1024. 
55. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 7, at 800-11. 
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ure at a university, 56 and the second as a partQ.er in an accounting 
firm. 57 The courts' remedial policy reasons consist of placing the 
plaintiffs where the defendants' compliance would have, and assuring 
the substantive law's integrity.58 In addition, the trial judge in Hop-
kins v. Price Waterhouse, the accounting firm litigation, registered 
skepticism "whether monetary relief alone provides a sufficient deter-
rent against future discrimination for a group of highly-paid part-
ners"59 - one way to tell the defendants they cannot. discriminate 
even if they are willing to pay for it. When the accounting firm argued 
against reinstatement because there was too much hostility to work 
together effectively, the trial judge observed that a large business entity 
"lacks the intimacy and interdependence of smaller partnerships."60 
The policies behind the irreparable injury rule and balancing the 
hardships - that some disputes are economic and should end with 
damages set by a neutral factfinder instead of with an exorbitant settle-
ment coerced in the shadow of an injunction - reemerge in adjudicat-
ing reinstatement orders. Judge Posner wrote a third recent 
employment discrimination opinion in McKnight v. General Motors 
Corp. 61 He inferred that the employee-plaintiff "want[ed] to be rein-
stated in order to induce GM to buy him out," and declared that "if 
the employee desires reinstatement for strategic purposes, that is a 
valid basis for denial."62 Posner, noting that the plaintiff's replace-
ment position paid more than the one he lost, speculated that the 
plaintiff might exchange a reinstatement order for valuable 
consideration. 63 
Judge Posner's opinion in McKnight compares reinstatement with 
money alternatives and discusses the remedial solution as a whole. 
But policy reasons to reinstate the wrongfully discharged employee are 
nowhere stated prominently.64 The McKnight d_ecision takes up the 
need to develop a remedy that will make the victim ''whole" only to 
ask whether, if Congress intend~d a whole and not a half loaf, the 
judge may substitute money, called front pay, for reinstatement.65 
56. Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337 (1st Cir. 1989), cerL denied, 111 S. Ct. 
1306 (1991). 
57. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 920 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir: 1990). 
58. See Hopkins, 920 F.2d at 976. 
59. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 737 F. Supp. 12Q2, 1211 (D.D.C.), affd., 920 F.2d 967 
(D.C. Cir. 1990). . . 
60. Hopkins, 737 F. Supp. at 1210. 
61. 908 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1990). 
62. 908 F.2d at 116. 
63. 908 F.2d at 116. 
64. Cf Hopkins, 920 F.2d at 976 ("[T]o the fullest extent possible, Title VII authorizes 
courts to put a victim of discrimination in the position that she or he would have been in but for 
the unlawful discrimination"). · 
65. McKnight, 908 F.2d at 116-17. 
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The McKnight court instructed the trial judge on remand to examine 
reinstatement and to decide, if reinstatement is denied, whether to 
award "front pay" - that is, whether to compensate the plaintiff with 
money set by a factfinder as an alternative to a large sum negotiated to 
settle a reinstatement order.66 
The question of when a court's statutory power to remedy employ-
ment discrimination will override reticence such as Judge Posner's will 
apparently remain on the agenda. 67 For it is part of the larger ques-
tion of when to subordinate the substantive law's policies to the reme-
dial system's. When a chary court declines to reinstate a civil rights 
plaintiff because it anticipates a coerced settlement, it raises questions 
perhaps more acute than the questions about balancing the hardships 
in land use disputes. Does fear of a hard settlement balance the vic-
tim's civil rights away? Does it undermine the policy of overcoming 
employment discrimination? Does declining to reinstate convert a 
plaintiff's right to work free from discrimination into an economic in-
terest that money will meliorate? If we believe that employees have 
the right to be free from discrimination, should the judges grant the 
injunction and let the employee, if she chooses, negotiate from a posi-
tion of strength? 
2. Administering Complex Relief 
Another equitable practice emerges in selecting employment dis-
crimination remedies. If, after an injunction, the parties do not com-
promise remedial goals by settling for money, the judge will be 
responsible for administering compliance. Judges who refuse to grant 
personal relief despite finding a risk of irreparable injury may describe 
complex enforcement as too impractical to administer or too difficult 
to supervise (pp. 222-24). Judge Posner stated the antisupervision im-
pulse in McKnight when he remonstrated trial judges to try to avoid 
supervising an "ongoing and possibly long-term relationship," almost 
as an alternative reason to decline reinstatement. 68 He touched on the 
judicial instinct to avoid supervising protracted acrimonious dealings 
between parties to a poisoned relationship as bearing upon the trial 
judge's discretionary decision to reinstate or not. 
Meanwhile, back at the trial court in Hopkins, the plaintiff had 
sought an injunction to "bar like discrimination in the future."69 An-
tisupervision emerged there as well. The trial judge felt that enjoining 
66. 908 F.2d at 117. 
67. See Hopkins, 920 F.2d at 980. 
68. McKnight, 908 F.2d at 115. 
69. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 737 F. Supp. 1202, 1216, affd., 920 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 
1990) (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (quoting Louisiana v. 
United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965))). 
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the defendant to adopt an antidiscrimination policy was too intrusive, 
too activist, too much: it is 
unreasonable to place the Court in a continuing monitoring role in re-
spect to the ill-defined area of sex stereotyping which the proof shows 
may occur without intention and is difficult to ascertain. . . . This is an 
area of sex discrimination that must evolve through more than the expe-
rience of one obviously atypical case before affirmative injunctions that 
can be fairly and evenly enforced can issue with any confidence. 70 
And so he was content to exhort: "Both male and female partners are 
on notice to avoid" sex stereotyping.71 
Developing reinstatement and hardships-balancing one step farther 
than does The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule discloses the rela-
tionship between the doctrines. Moreover, two doctrines that lead 
courts to eschew injunctions - fear of coerced settlement and an-
tisupervision - may function alternatively, one based on the projec-
tion that the plaintiff will not enforce the order, the other that she will. 
Each is easier to wield once a judge decides that the dispute is primar-
ily economic. The policies that undergird the irreparable injury rule 
resurface at a later stage of analysis. Skeptics may inquire whether 
placing the antisupervision impulse on the scales will undercut sub-
stantive interests and the claimant's preferences in the same way as 
balancing the hardships because of fear of "extorted" settlements. 
How the judicial preference to avoid supervision will affect deci-
sions depends upon the particular dispute, upon the strength of the 
substantive standard, and upon the individual judge, the chancellor's 
foot. Scholarship and decisions will, I hope, clarify some of the most 
muddled doctrine in the advance sheets. For example, a judge rejected 
a shopping center's request for a preliminary injunction to compel a 
retail tenant to continue in business under a twenty-year lease: "CBL 
has no chance of prevailing on the merits and getting a permanent 
injunction because of the well-settled principle that equity will not or-
der the specific performance of a contract where doing so would re-
quire the continuous supervision of the court."72 So much for purists 
who thought that not prevailing on the merits meant losing on the 
substantive law, instead of being refused a remedy because of a reme-
dial policy. 
C. Prior Restraint 
In the chapter on "Avoiding Over Enforcement," Laycock makes 
several important points about the prior restraint rules (pp. 164-68). 
The irreparable injury rule does not come directly into play with prior 
restraint; in fact, the plaintiff's noninjunctive damage or criminal rem-
70. Hopkins, 737 F. Supp. at 1216. 
71. 737 F. Supp. at 1216. 
72. CBL & Assocs., Inc. v. McCrory Corp., 761 F. Supp. 807, 808-09 (M.D. Ga. 1991). 
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edy is usually palpably inadequate. While prior restraint may be re-
lated to irreparable injury in perverse ways, the prior restraint rules 
provide a freestanding reason to disfavor injunctions and select an-
other remedy instead. Following adversary procedure, courts issue in-
junctions against unprotected "speech" to suppress sexually explicit 
movies and commercial disparagement, protect discovery material, 
regulate securities and advertising, and stop copyright infringement. 73 
Laycock's explanatory statement that the "prior restraint rules limit 
plaintiffs to less effective remedies because we fear over enforcement of 
rules against tortious or criminal speech" (p. 165) assumes that the 
defendant's conduct will breach a constitutional rule of substantive 
law and that, because of the prior restraint rule, courts attempting to 
vindicate the plaintiff's substantive interest will favor retrospective 
damage judgments and criminal sanctions over injunctions that allow 
plaintiffs to enjoy their rights in fact. 
While not formally staking out a position in the prior restraint de-
bate, Laycock appears to support the doctrine. He uses prior restraint 
as a synonym for injunction: "It is not the law that the plaintiff can 
get a prior restraint only when no other remedy is as clear, practical, 
and efficient as a prior restraint" (p. 165). The prior restraint doctrine 
militates against an injunction that the plaintiff requests and that, 
aside from the doctrine, the substantive law may support. Sometimes, 
as the following example shows, judicial prejudice against an injunc-
tion is difficult to discern. 
A male college student surreptitiously tapes an office conversation 
with a new woman professor. He then mixes her distinctive voice on 
the tape with other material to concoct a second tape that purports to 
be one of her engaging in a sexual misadventure. Plans are developed 
to play the hoax tape over the campus radio station. The professor 
learns about the tape and seeks an interlocutory injunction to bar the 
student from broadcasting or disseminating the tape and to force him 
to tum it over to the court. The professor asserts, with support from 
professionals' affidavits, that the tape is false and defamatory and that 
playing it will undermine her relationships with her students and her 
spouse, as well as devastate her personally. 
Playing the tape would be defamatory, and the professor could re-
cover damages. Precedent under state constitutions, however, sup-
ports a judge who declines to enjoin the broadcast. "Defamation alone 
is not a sufficient justification for restraining an individual's right to 
73. See Ocasek v. Hegglund, 116 F.R.D. 154, 160 (D. Wyo. 1987) (excusing plaintiff from 
establishing irreparable injury). 
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speak freely. "74 Contrary authority is scarce and attenuated. 75 If the 
defendant violates the substantive law and if the victim prefers an in-
junction now to damages later, what remedial policy might lead a 
judge to say or assume that a damages judgment will be appropriate 
but that an injunction will not? Prior restraint rules tell courts to de-
cline to enjoin because of a preference to let the misconduct happen 
and let the victim pursue a civil damages judgment. The prior re-
straint doctrine may stand for the idea that, while this is misconduct 
the state can regulate, attempts to enjoin it will cause other people in 
the future not to engage in important conduct that the state cannot 
regulate. So the judge will stand idly by and let the defendant injure 
the plaintiff because otherwise some hypothetical future conduct may 
not occur. Perhaps Cornford expressed the notion best: "The Princi-
ple of the Dangerous Precedent is that you should not do an admittedly 
right action for fear you, or your equally timid successors, should not 
have the courage to do right in some future case, which, ex hypothesi, 
is essentially different, but superficially resembles the present one."76 
Why should courts subordinate the plaintiff's preference and the 
substantive law? Four hazards of the injunction process are: interloc-
utory injunction procedure may be attenuated, even ex parte; the re-
quest for an injunction will be heard by a judge without a jury; 
injunction breaches are tried, normally by the judge, as contempt; and 
an injunction's incorrectness, even unconstitutionality, will not be a 
defense to criminal contempt. 
Constitutional decisions have curbed, but perhaps not eliminated, 
ex parte procedures where expression may be enjoined.77 Nonjury tri-
als and contempt enforcement continue to distinguish injunctions 
from damage actions;. In asserting that "[j]ury trial rarely protects 
speech in a republic" (p. 166), Laycock stresses the civil jury's vital 
function of interpreting the public will to the courts less than I would. 
But I focus on whether courts ought to retain the prior restraint doc-
trines as principles of containment to hinder promiscuous issuance of 
injunctions if those doctrines would allow the campus radio station to 
broadcast the defamatory hoax tape. 1s 
74. Hajek v. Bill Mowbray Motors, Inc., 647 S.W.2d 253, 255 (I'ex. 1983). Willing v. Maz-
zocone, 393 A.2d 1155 (Pa. 1978), goes a little farther, assuming that, even if the defendant is 
unable to pay a damage judgment, plaintiff will not receive an injunction; for "the economic 
status of the individual asserting that right" cannot affect "the constitutional right to freely ex-
press one's opinion." 393 A.2d at 1158. See also Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666 (3d Cir. 
1991), a careful and thorough decision holding that Pennsylvania law does not allow injunctions 
against future libel. 
75. See Lothschuetz v. Carpenter, 898 F.2d 1200, 1203, 1208 (6th Cir. 1990). 
76. FRANCIS M. CoRNFORD, MICROCOSMOGRAPHIA ACADEMICA: BEING A GUIDE FOR 
THE YOUNG ACADEMIC PoLmCIAN 23 (6th ed. 1964) (1908). 
77. Carroll v. President & Commrs. of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968). 
78. If the tape had been played once privately and adjudicated to be defamatory, would the 
prior restraint doctrines caution the judge to decline to enjoin? The answer may be no. See 
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The analysis does not differ if the judge cites the prior restraint 
doctrine to decline to enjoin on the ground that the authorities may 
pursue criminal alternatives- "subsequent punishment or penalties." 
Laycock adds that "[t]he policy base of the rules against prior restraint 
is our commitment to freedom of speech and the traditional belief that 
prior restraints are more dangerous to free speech than subsequent 
penalties" (p. 165). The prior-subsequent distinction is questionable 
because an injunction, a personalized minicriminal statute, is· just as 
subsequent as the presumed alternative, a criminal statute. If common 
words have common meaning, both are prior. An injunction is a piece 
of paper with the defendant's name on it that forbids conduct. Like 
the paper threat in the statute book, an injunction does not literally 
prevent a crime; injunctions and criminal statutes do, however, struc-
ture the defendant's incentives by warning of a sanction, contempt, or 
a criminal prosecution. 
The prior-subsequent distinction assumes that the defendant will 
obey the injunction. Bickel's well-known but overblown metaphor 
posits: "A criminal statute chills, a prior restraint freezes."79 In mak-
ing the point that criminal punishment is inadequate, Laycock appears 
to assume the defendant's compliance with an injunction: "Criminal 
punishment neither undoes the harm nor compensates for it. It may 
be good for revenge or deterrence, but it is not a remedy" (p. 166). A 
criminal statute with a certain punishment - 100 years in solitary for 
littering - also "freezes" expressive conduct that may be constitution-
ally protected and unconstitutionally regulated. 80 
A criminal statute and an injunction are prior and intended to de-
ter; a criminal prosecution and a contempt prosecution are subsequent 
and intended to punish. If we take prior restraint out of the refrigera-
tor and discuss what the words prior and restraint mean separately, we 
learn quickly they do not mean much. Nor do we know what they 
mean combined. While the Court has said the proponent confronts 
the "heavy burden" or "heavy presumption" against a prior restraint, 
"there remains no canonical formulation of the prior restraint 
standard."81 
I prefer to dispense with the thought-stopping shibboleth prior re-
straint and to approach the matter like other injunction-noninjunction 
decisions. The plaintiff seeks an injunction against conduct by the de-
Lothschuetz v. Carpenter, 898 F.2d 1200, 1206 (6th Cir. 1990); 898 F.2d at 1208-09 (Wellford, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 898 F.2d at 1209 (Hull, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623 (1977) & app. (1981) (Special 
Note On Remedies for Defamation Other Than Damages). But, given the mystical power of the 
words prior restraint, prudence counsels against definitive prediction. 
79. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 61 (1975). 
80. Frederick Schauer, Parsing the Pentagon Papers 3 (May 1991) (Joan Shorenstein Barone 
Center Research Paper R-3). 
81. Id. at 11 n.62. 
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fendant that is expression-related and arguably constitutionally pro-
tected. Perhaps the court will find that the defendant's speech is 
constitutionally protected and end its analysis. If not, substantive vio-
lation found, the court will proceed to remedy, looking first at the 
policies of the substantive law scheme the defendant is charged with 
violating. The judge will favor the plaintiff's choice of an injunction if 
it advances the interests the substantive law protects. Questions here 
will include predictive inquiries about how likely it is that the defend-
ant will violate the law again in the future and whether this breach will 
cause the plaintiff harm. 
Reallocating the existing "burden" or "presumption" against prior 
restraints, however, the defendant may show that remedial policies 
militate against an injunction. Reasons to disfavor injunctions against 
expression-related conduct seemingly are a specialized version of the 
reasons for the irreparable injury rule; we seek principles of contain-
ment because we fear undiscerning interlocutory procedure, lack of a 
citizen jury to ward off government overreaching, a preponderance 
burden of proof, and contempt maintained by the very judge who ad-
judicated liability, with the injunction insulated by the collateral bar 
rule from substantive scrutiny. An important lesson of The Death of 
the Irreparable Injury Rule is that we should examine principles of 
containment directly instead of filtering them through distorting 
cliches like prior restraint. 
IV. ENDING THE IIR's REIGN 
A. Reform 
We can approach reform of the irreparable injury rule in several 
ways. First, the rule may be constitutionally based: the judicial power 
to choose between damages and injunctions in ways that subordinate 
injunctions because of their adjudicative shortcuts and administrative 
burdens may be an inherent part of Article III and equivalent state 
judicial power that cannot be abrogated except by constitutional deci-
sions or constitutional amendment. 82 The judicial erosion of the irrep-
arable injury rule, particularly by decisions that enjoin to protect 
constitutional rights without considering alternatives, diminishes the 
prospect that the irreparable injury rule is an inherent part of the judi-
cial power. 
Second, the courts themselves may possess common law adjudica-
tory authority to develop and circumscribe a doctrine like the irrepa-
rable injury rule that structures a judge's choice between remedies. 
The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule suggests that courts have 
curbed the rule; it is itself part of the reform process (pp. 37-98). 
82. See Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2132 (1991). Professor Gene Shreve sug-
gested this to me. 
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Through professional criticism, judicial exceptions, and attrition, 
scholars and judges have diminished the irreparable injury rule to 
nominal survival and prepared the way for the bold Professor Laycock 
to write its epitaph. 83 
Laycock is not persuaded that the courts' work described in the 
prior paragraph completes the rule's demise. He suggests a third op-
tion: legislatures, including Congress, should enact statutes to negate 
the irreparable injury rule (pp. 276-78). He commends to them a draft 
statute that neutralizes the irreparable injury rule without codifying 
the interests and specific rules. 
Some questions about political practicality spring to mind. When 
developing platforms and legislative agendas, what political parties, in-
terest groups, and lobbyists will rally to extirpate the irreparable in-
jury rule? What coalitions will form to support this worthy reform? 
What constituent interest groups will emerge to petition, buttonhole, 
and importune legislators to eradicate this pest? What members of 
Congress and state legislatures will assign staff, sponsor bills, and 
schedule hearings on this riveting topic? Which networks and news-
papers will cover these hearings? 
"An important reason for court rulemaking," Professor Car-
rington, Reporter to the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, ob-
served, "is that complex technical issues of judicial practice cannot 
sustain attention through the political process."84 Unless an outrage 
causes public clamor, the status quo possesses monumental inertia. 
The legislator's need to tax, spend, and secure reelection virtually as-
sure the legislative proposal's oblivion. 
Amendment of procedural rules is a fourth possibility. I suggest 
additions to Federal Rule 8 and state equivalent rules. The first sug-
gestion is a second paragraph in the rule on claims for relief: 
A claimant requesting an injunction, specific performance, or any other 
equitable relief or personal order need not allege or prove that the dam-
ages or other relief are inadequate or that irreparable injury will occur 
without the order. The defending party may object to personal relief on 
any ground that makes it less appropriate than another remedy. 
For neatness and consistency, the second sentence might be added to 
defenses. 85 An additional affirmative defense would be "adequate 
remedy at law, lack of irreparable injury."86 
Laycock specifically rejects procedural amendments to abolish the 
irreparable injury rule. "[R]ules of civil procedure are not supposed to 
change substantive law," he writes, "and I have little doubt that the 
83. The phrase nominal survival comes from EISENBERG, supra note 25, at 118. 
84. Paul D. Carrington, ''Substance" and ''Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 
DUKE L.J. 281, 282. 
85. FED. R. Clv. P. 8(b). 
86. FED. R. C1v. P. 8(c). 
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[irreparable injury rule] is substantive" (p. 278). In addition, however, 
to the subject's technicality, mentioned above, using a procedural 
amendment to neutralize the irreparable injury rule would update 
Federal Rule 2, which set a "civil action" as "one form of action."87 
One of Laycock's reasons for choosing legislation - that courts 
have treated remedies as substantive - may be less than dispositive. 
He cites a state-versus-federal choice of law decision. 88 He appears to 
conclude that substance-procedure characterization made in the con-
text of deciding whether to select state or federal law carries over to 
another context - namely, whether a subject is amenable to rules 
amendment or statute. One substantive characterization does not 
overcome the richness and complexity of procedural reform. This as-
sumption may yield to more particularized decisionmaking where · 
meaning and classification depend on the function and policy environ-
ment of each particular decision. A classification as substantive that is 
animated by federalism principles may not compel a similar decision 
where separation of powers policies inform the discussion. 89 
B. The Law and the Enterprise 
Laycock has an invigorating intellect, for after he observes courts 
using the irreparable injury rule incongruently, he assumes an air of 
injured innocence and proceeds with assiduity to set the matter right. 
The legal realist is the nemesis of a legal rule that was a ruse. The 
words irreparable injury did not mean what they sounded like they 
should mean. And by any standard of what those words meant, the 
courts were not deciding disputes the way the rule told them to decide. 
Finally, Laycock reorganizes the doctrine .to comport with the trend of 
decisions and to improve the way courts could administer the choice 
of remedies. 
It is, however, important for Laycock to say what is and is not The 
Law.90 Laycock evidences his loyalty to the concept of Uppercase 
Blackletter by ending The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule with a 
tentative restatement, the rules offered in bold print (pp. 265-7 6). Lay-
cock looks out over a legal landscape where remedial rules are certain 
and exist in texts. 
Concluding that the legal process is not formulated so canonically, 
those with more fluid and less fixed views about the enterprise of gov-
ernment through courts - as well as about the injunction's potential 
peril and profit - will direct their attention to the wide potential 
range of possible practical solutions to particular disputes. Viewing 
87. FED. R. CIV. P. 2. 
88. Pp. 278 & 285 n.14 (citing Monessen Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330 
(1988)). 
89. See Carrington, supra note 84, at 284-85. 
90. P. 260 (my uppercase). 
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the study of remedies as not restricted to a "discrete normative do-
main distinguishable from the entire normative universe,"91 they will 
call for additional remedial research on constitutional adjudication 
and principles of containment as well as on the moral, economic, polit-
ical, and administrative values that inform judges' choices between al-
ternative remedies. 
Judges create remedial solutions called rules and simultaneously 
apply them to events that occurred before the rule was promulgated; 
they may modify and supplant standards the litigants previously 
thought applied. A precedent is a present signal to unknown future 
disputants: this decision decides your dispute also. Remedies decisions 
differ as precedent from substantive decisions. They provide scant ba-
sis for planning primary conduct; no one should rely on an earlier 
remedial solution to violate the substantive law.92 Remedies opinions 
also have an uncanny tendency to approach and recede as precedents 
under the pressure of the adversary technique leading to adjudication. 
For difficult remedial decisions contain a justification or background, a 
standard, and a discrete solution; a lawyer or judge may articulate 
each as the opinion's "rule." 
Because it illustrates the preceding discussion of our different ways 
of looking at the law and the judicial enterprise in the context of legal 
education, I will not resist one lapse from my repugnance at revisiting 
the scenes of my youthful delinquencies. Laycock's discussion of 
whether judges will enjoin a trespass includes a summary of Chancel-
lor Kent's artful 1823 decision, Jerome v. Ross. 93 In the course of con-
cluding that Kent stumbled, Laycock observes that "[t]he opinion still 
appears in a well-known casebook" (p. 39). As a coeditor of that 
"well-known casebook,"94 I feel constrained to, first of all, thank the 
author for the adjective, but second to observe that I aspire for Note 1 
following Jerome in the casebook to be even better known. For that 
Note cites and quotes authorities to the effect that "modern" decisions 
subscribe to another approach. 95 
In a law school casebook the pedagogical value of a well-reasoned 
but "incorrect" decision cannot, in my opinion, be gainsaid. Under-
standing Jerome's social and political environment against the cited 
precedential matrix is worth the effort. Whether Chancellor Kent de-
cided Jerome correctly is less important today than whether he identi-
fied the issues and formulated the arguments correctly. The 
chancellor's discussion of the damage measures (including punitive 
91. Frederick Schauer, Is the Common Law Law?, 11 CAL. L. REV. 455, 456 (1989) (review· 
ing EISENBERG, supra note 25); EISENBERG, supra note 25, at 153. 
92. See EISENBERG, supra note 25, at 110-11. 
93. P. 39 (discussing Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315 (N.Y. Ch. 1823)). 
94. FISS & RENDLEMAN, supra note 36. 
95. Id. at 76. 
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damages) directs our attention to the alternatives to an injunction. In 
one felicitous but long-winded sentence, alone worth the price of ad-
mission, Chancellor Kent reminded us that the lack of a jury and the 
harshness of contempt militated against an injunction: 
The objection to the injunction, in cases of private trespass, except under 
very special circumstances, is, that it would be productive of public in-
convenience, by drawing cases of ordinary trespass within the cogni-
zance of equity, and by calling forth, upon all occasions, its power to 
punish by attachment, fine and imprisonment, for a further commission 
of trespass, instead of the more gentle common law remedy by action, 
and the assessment of damages by a jury.96 
CONCLUSION 
The curious reader who turns to the copyright page of the first 
printing of The Death of the I"eparable Injury Rule will notice the 
Library of Congress cataloging data on a sticker pasted over an earlier 
set of data. Instead of scraping the sticker off and making a mess like I 
did, read on. The call numbers below differ. The cataloguer who se-
lected the original numbers had taken a cue from the words death and 
injury in the title. The original numbers would have located The 
Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule on the Washington and Lee li-
brary shelf ignominiously tagging behind the Lawyers' Medical 
Cyclopedia-Personal Injuries and Allied Specialties, a humbling loca-
tion for all of us who love equity and believe that what we do is impor-
tant. A correction Library of Congress sticker was prepared and 
pasted over the old. The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule is now 
ensconced next to Chafee, the equity giant of the first half of the 
century. 
A trip to the advance sheets was just as humbling as scraping off a 
pasted-in Library of Congress sticker. A trial judge in a corporate 
dispute, which should have been well-briefed, managed to get almost 
everything backwards.97 Here are the court's incorrect statements, 
with countercitations to correct statements in The Death of the Irrepa-
rable Injury Rule: adequate remedy at law and irreparable harm are 
distinct tests;98 the inadequate remedy at law prerequisite for prelimi-
nary and permanent injunction is the same;99 "Injunctions are ex-
traordinary remedies that are generally not favored"; 100 mandatory 
injunctions are more disfavored "since they compel a person to act 
rather than simply maintain the status quo," and the plaintiff must 
96. Id. at 67 (quoting Jerome). 
97. Justin Indus. v. Choctaw Sec., 747 F. Supp. 1218 (N.D. Tex. 1990). 
98. 747 F. Supp. at 1220. But see pp. 8-9. 
99. 747 F. Supp. at 1220. But see pp. 110-32. 
100. 747 F. Supp. at 1220. But see p. 5 n.6 & p. 253. 
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show a clear legal and factual entitlement. 101 Finally, the judge de-
cided against the claimant, because the substantive law did not sup-
port relief; but in describing the result he stated that the claimant 
lacked irreparable harm and had an adequate remedy at law.102 
This review began by commending The Death of the Irreparable 
Injury Rule to the widest possible professional audience. Laycock's 
carefully researched and clearly written statements of present doctrine 
push back the frontiers of learning; they will, if they find their way 
into the professional vernacular, improve students' and lawyers' un-
derstanding, judges' decisions, and the administration of justice. 
In a preceding paragraph, I left The Death of the Irreparable Injury 
Rule on the shelf next to Chafee, where it ought to be classified - but 
not remain. Additional reasons to read and evaluate it clamor for at-
tention. Laycock's important contributions include demonstrating 
that the legal-equitable vocabulary is remedially nonfunctional; 
describing what courts actually decide under the irreparable injury 
test; suggesting that the courts' approach be changed by putting on the 
defendant the onus of opposing personal relief; shining the spotlight of 
his research on silliness and redundancy; and organizing and formulat-
ing more precise principles of containment. 
The irreparable injury rule deceived us into thinking that judges 
were making discerning remedial choices; we can now tum our atten-
tion to more effective analysis of principles of confinement and ways, 
when its time comes round again, to use the injunction as a vehicle for 
social reform without endangering important libertarian values. 
Policymakers must consider carefully the reforms Laycock advocates. 
Finally, the injunction against Operation Rescue in Wichita hit the 
front page just as I was rereading The Death of the Irreparable Injury 
Rule to write this review. 103 Wichita had it all. A divisive issue. Bi-
ble-quoting preachers. Protesters in the hundreds. Counterdemon-
strators. An injunction that wasn't working. An off-balance federal 
judge. A reluctant federal executive. Does any of this sound familiar? 
Then, while I was writing this review, Bray v. Alexandria Women's 
Health Clinic was argued before the Supreme Court.104 Why is the 
injunction, particularly the federal injunction, worth fighting for and 
against? The question Bray raises is whether, under the theory that 
blocking access to abortion clinics violates patients' right to travel, the 
federal court possesses federal question jurisdiction under section 1985 
to enjoin protesters? The clinic protesters prefer to face state criminal 
101. 747 F. Supp. at 1220. But see pp. 242-43. 
102. 747 F. Supp. at 1223. But see pp. 196-200. 
103. See Women's Health Care Servs. v. Operation Rescue-Natl., 773 F. Supp. 258 (D. Kan. 
1991). 
104. See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991) (granting writ of 
certiorari). 
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charges - with jury trials. The controversies reveal to me how the 
injunction's expedited procedure, lack of a jury, and contempt enforce-
ment concentrate judicial power and create the need for principles of 
containment to curb abuses and excesses. Chancellor Kent, where are 
you when we need you? 
Professor Laycock has developed his functional analysis of reme-
dies to the "operative rule . . . that equitable relief is not extraordi-
nary" (p. 243). I put The Death of the I"eparable Injury Rule down 
believing that, despite all the contributions Laycock makes, he thinks 
the injunction is just another remedy. Readers whose remedial topog-
raphy has higher peaks and deeper valleys than The Death of the I"ep-
arable Injury Rule's will examine it in vain for the injunction's unique 
concentration of power with its dual potential for articulating public, 
particularly constitutional, values and· for threatening individual 
liberties. 
